The People's Concept of the State—Decline and Rebirth

Der völkiſche Staatsgedanke

Untergang und Neugeburt

von

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„Die Erde iſt nicht da
für feige Völker"
Adolf Hitler

2. Auflage

München 1924

Deutſchvölkiſche Verlagsbuchhandlung
Franz Eher Nachf. G.m.b.H.
München NO 2

by Alfred Rosenberg

"The earth is not for cowardly peoples."

- Adolf Hitler

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Deutschvölkische Verlagsbuchhandlung
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Printed by: M. Müller & Sohn, a Munich-based book publisher, Munich.

In times of peace, the division of opinion takes place almost imperceptibly: slowly, over the course of decades, an internal shift takes place regarding issues of worldview and the state, until, finally, this tension within a people—or among different national entities as a whole—reaches such a degree that a release must occur.
War replaces the bond of peace, and catastrophe replaces slow development - thus, it is only in such times that people suddenly realize just how deeply minds had already diverged, and they discover that, in times of decision, old views—many of which are still revered—sink back into oblivion, while other, entirely new syntheses suddenly come to life, which captivate all who are searching, struggling, and striving.

It cannot be our task, at least for now, to characterize individual epochs of intellectual and political decision-making from the past with a definitive value judgment; instead, it must simply be noted that at the beginning of the 16th century, a great tension reached a breaking point, and the idea proclaimed by Luther swept through all the states of Europe; then, in 1789, it once again hung over the entire world like an omnipresent force - thus, just as the attempt at religious and political renewal began in 1517, so here a new conception of the state entered into a conscious opposition to another: one prevailed, and the other crumbled.

Today we once again find ourselves in the midst of a struggle that is both ideological and political in nature: even if the eternally lukewarm and the eternally cowardly refuse to acknowledge this—and continue to hide their lukewarmness and cowardice behind old, long-since rotten conceptions of the state, so as to avoid having to take a stand on the issues of the present and the future—the struggle has begun, and it will not end until a new synthesis of life has prevailed, first in one European country, then in the others.
We all feel a sense of collapse within us today, and we also have a deep longing for a new way of life: we no longer want the past, we hate the present, and we strive for the future of the German people.

1. The Roman Concept of the State

The ancient Roman state was a product of conquest: waves of Nordic peoples—the precursors of the later Germanic invasions—swept across the Alps and subjugated the indigenous population, and the Nordic ruling class then imposed a harsh form of government and way of life on the vanquished - thus, Rome became an empire defined by its Nordic racial character.
The struggles that followed were not class struggles, nor were they primarily economic conflicts, but rather racial struggles—uprisings by the indigenous peoples who had been cast into state structures.
The 300 senators represented the 300 ruling families, and from among them, the governors of the provinces were appointed: at that time, Rome was not yet a world empire, but rather a power-state centered on a specific ethnic group.
And yet, surrounded by many hostile nations, it was constantly forced to push its borders further - thus, with victory came ambition, and with fame came the idea of world power: from a small nucleus, a world empire emerged.

This expansion brought internal strife to a head, as rebellious patricians, driven by ambition, placed themselves at the head of the discontented—non-Nordic—plebeians: the strict division between these different ethnic elements then receded more and more.
In the middle of the 5th century B.C., intermarriage was permitted, and at the same time, a swarm of peoples from North Africa, Syria, and Asia Minor poured into the cosmopolitan city: a tremendous racial dissolution—the democratic age of Rome—began, until the late, raceless Rome—collapsed.
But its idea—the idea of a world empire—endured, and took root as a romantic ideal in the minds and souls of the new—Germanic—conquerors.
At the same time, another universal idea arose: Christianity, whose goal was the universal Church; the world state and the universal Church merged into one.

Even though the proponents of one idea waged bitter wars against the representatives of the other for centuries, the Holy Roman Empire remained the ideal of an era spanning a thousand years; the state under Frederick the Great, however, brought about the collapse of this ideal, before a second collapse then followed in 1806; finally, in 1918, this concept of the state was laid to rest along with the Habsburgs...
Whichever dynasty wore the Roman imperial crown, they were all drawn southward with demonic force: the Ottonians, the Henries, the Fredericks, and the Conrads—each of them can look back on multiple military campaigns to the south, either to subdue the Pope or to crush rebellious vassals.
One crusade after another devoured thousands upon thousands of the finest men of Nordic blood: they did not all fall for their people, but succumbed to a phantom, an idea that had nothing in common with the needs of the race from which they sprang.
Deep, deep in the south, in the Cathedral of Palermo, stands the stone sarcophagi of German emperors as a symbol of the romantic imperial dream of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation…

And yet, in the face of today's disgrace, we must state with pride, for the German name was known and feared in those days, from the North Sea all the way down to the distant Mediterranean, and lords of all lands bowed the knee before the German Emperor; the splendor and power, but also the art of that era and the beginnings of science, should make today's merely "civilized" Germans realize that their people are not a people devoid of history and character, but one that, despite profound collapses, rose again and again to power and honor—a people of a great past and the manifestation of a primal force that can still offer hope for a great future.

2. The Concept of the Dynastic State

Under the guise of the Roman concept of universalism, however, an organic counter-movement had been unfolding ever since its initial advance into Western and Central Europe—a movement that, throughout the centuries and in all spheres of life, prioritized self-determination over the rule of a purely secular, unitarian principle.
The bloody struggles among Gothic ruling dynasties, the Albigensian Wars, the desperate struggle of the Frisian Stedinger[1]—who were later exterminated—the Hussite Wars, and the Reformation movement: all

[1] Referring to the Stedinger Crusade, which took place between 1233 and 1234 - in this struggle, Frisian peasants rebelled against their archbishop over taxes and property rights, and in response, the archbishop, sanctioned by the

of these are, in the final analysis, outbursts, catastrophes, revolutions—or whatever one may call the eruptions of world history—that arose time and again over the centuries from the contrast between two fundamental attitudes.
Parallel to these developments, organic economic and political unification was taking place in all the countries of Europe: the northern Italian city-state leagues were forming; powerful economic and political cartels were emerging along the entire Rhine; the free imperial cities of southern and central Germany were claiming an ever-stronger special status, and high in the north, a power emerged that could serve as one of the models for the future German Reich: the Hanseatic League.
Coupled with an irrepressible drive for expansion—exploiting the treasures of the sea to build a proud, power-oriented organization—the free Hanseatic League emerged, which was imbued with a sense of national identity and aristocratic spirit, despite the apparent insignificance of purely national labor; it was a time when, once again, the German name meant something throughout the world, and the blue-and-white Hanseatic flag was known from London to Novgorod, and German merchants captured English kings on the high seas.

Throughout Europe, this departure from the single, supranational concept of power is taking place: in France and England, it first found national realization on a large scale, and this laid the foundations for that general sense of national and state identity which both nations have preserved to this day.
Since the reign of Louis XI, the concentration of the French state has proceeded with ever greater purpose and vigor, yet its distinctive character is now fading: the underlying concept of the nation-state is giving way to a lasting, purely centralist dynastic structure.
All the forces of the people are increasingly converging on a single point, and here arises the social culture of the French kings, which dazzled and inspired Europe; here the center of European military and power politics takes shape, and in Paris, the threads of diplomacy are woven and severed—yet at the same time, a spirit of free thought radiates from Paris throughout the world.
The dark side of this dynastic-centralist ideology, however, inevitably manifests itself in the atrophy of the entire provinces, and the saying attributed to Louis XIV—"I am the state"—characterizes the purely subjectivist constitution into which the concept of the nation-state had evaporated.
The era of a "greenhouse culture" was drawing near, and France's originally Germanic ruling class, unworthy of its task, crumbled into ruins in 1789 under the blows of a new sense of nationhood.

Meanwhile, the purely dynastic, subjective ideology began its triumphant march through Central Europe, distorting here as well the organic aspirations for self-determination of the German imperial cities and German principalities in the face of the idea of the supranational Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation.
Every prince imitated the court of Louis XIV, and Germany then found itself in a period of its greatest fragmentation; Italy too presents a similar picture, as here, too, the disintegration of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation takes place due to the emergence of purely subjective power instincts on the part of individual princes: none of them is strong enough to override all the others and realize the unity of the Italian fatherland so longed for by Italian thinkers, a step that wasn't realized until the 19th century.

Papacy, started a crusade against the rebels, which resulted in their ultimate defeat. This struggle was commemorated in the Third Reich. - The Translator

Another step followed after the Great War, which was brought about by Fascism - however, the final step, of a domestic political nature, has yet to come.

3. The Frederickian Concept of the State

Amid all the chaos in Germany and amidst German princes who had forgotten their duties, a new state entity arose on the sands of the Mark with a primal force—one that, for the first time in Europe, brought to fruition those ideas destined to lay the foundations for a national state in the future.
The recognition of the reciprocity of the concept of duty between the people and the ruling elite, the recognition and enforcement of the national concept of honor above economic and financial interests, and the will to assert national self-assertion by any means necessary—these are the ideas from which the Frederickian state arose, and which make it appear to us today as a shining example for the future.

The beginning of the Frederickian state is generally traced back to the reign of the Great Elector - however, a few years ago (by Rehm in the *Politisch-Anthropologische Monatsschrift*)[2], it was pointed out—to my knowledge for the first time, and quite rightly—that this characterization is incorrect except insofar as it pertains to the Great Elector; rather, to understand the essence of the new Prussian state, one must go much deeper, for here, too, we are dealing with that instinctive and organic turning away of the German people from the dictatorship of world power exercised by the so-called Roman Empire, which caused German blood to be shed in northern Italy, Rome, and Palestine for interests that were incomprehensible to the German people at home.
Here it is important to point out that symbolic act which Henry the Lion performed when he renounced his allegiance to Frederick Barbarossa and rebelled against the madness of the Italian campaigns: the same man who, in loyal service to his Emperor, risked his very life to save the Emperor from the Tiber Bridge; this Bavarian duke, fully aware of his objective duty, set aside this personal bond and set in motion a new chapter in German history.
Henry the Lion, said to be the founder of Munich, is also the founder of the city of Lübeck; he directed German expansion toward the East and thereby created the first strong bulwarks against the encroaching Eastern tide—those bulwarks that stretched across the Baltic provinces as far as the Narova River and which today, though partly in ruins, were what first made a life as a nation possible for the German people.
It was from this political foundation that the State of Brandenburg arose, and no one was more conscious of fighting for a united Germany than the much-maligned and mocked Marquis of Brandenburg, Frederick William, for it was he who coined the great phrase that every German knows today:

"Remember that you are a German."

These words of the great Elector—which, in these days of present disgrace, ought to be etched in fiery letters upon all our hearts—were spoken by a man who fought, alone and with waning strength, for a

[2] C. Friedrich Rehm; the referenced article is "Das Wesen des preussischen Staatsgedenkens" (*The Essence of the Prussian State Ideology*), which was published in *Politisch-Anthropologische Monatsschrift*'s May 1920 issue. - The Translator

distant cause, knowing full well that it would indeed triumph, yet without his eyes ever being allowed to witness it.
There is yet another saying attributed to him - surrounded by enemies and physically overcome after a long struggle, he said:

"May an avenger one day rise from my bones..."

As the third statesman of a less significant era, the "Potato King" Frederick William I[3] appears, and with purposeful self-restraint, this man directed all his skill toward building the internal resilience and economic strength of his Prussia.
The advancement of agriculture is one of the cornerstones of this state, and the establishment of trade schools, the Prussian elementary school, and compulsory education also traces back to him - thus, in the midst of a regime of princes and favorites who feasted lavishly and paid no heed to the people, a frugality—a frugality driven to the point of miserliness—emerged here as the conscious will to create a different kind of state.
Under the weight of the realization that, in the midst of a hostile Europe, all the blessings of civilized life could be protected only by a strong army, the "Potato King" raised an army that would one day fight gloriously on every battlefield in Europe - Frederick William thus left his son a legacy based on these principles:

"Be your own master and ensure the welfare of your subjects; cast aside pride and arrogance, and build a great army—the others seek to overrun us."

When Frederick William died, his son inherited an army of 83,000 soldiers - thus, little Prussia stood in defiance against wealthy France, which boasted an army of 150,000, and even mighty Austria had no more than 100,000 soldiers.

Thus were the preconditions for the reign of the "Flute King"[4] established, and when Frederick the Great ascended the throne in 1740, he wrote to a friend:

"My highest God is my duty."

No state could ever have withstood such a trial as Prussia did under Frederick the Great had it not been forged by those seemingly impractical ideas of duty and honor, which alone are capable of forming states and sustaining nations.
In Frederick the Great, for the first time in German history, that union of ruler and servant—ruler over a people and servant of the national ideal—is embodied: this living awareness sustained Frederick the Great throughout his entire life.

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[3] This nickname is generally attributed to Frederick the Great due to his orders to German peasants to grow potatoes in order to fight against grain shortages, not his father, whose nickname was the "Soldier-King". - The Translator
[4] This nickname is generally attributed to Frederick the Great, who practiced with a flute daily. - The Translator

There are sometimes events in history that symbolically embody, as it were, the inner essence of a national ideal and its power - thus, it was after the ill-fated Battle of Kolin that Frederick the Great received a humiliating peace offer, and he wrote in response to Berlin:

"I will not sign a dishonorable peace, even if I were to take what bears the name of Prussia with me to the grave."

Only a man who was conscious that he, his people, and his state formed an inseparable unity—who felt that the idea he represented symbolized the inner necessity of an entire people—could have put these words down: it was from this alone that he could he have drawn the strength to confront an entire state with the question of its very survival.

Another symbolic event was the days of November 1918 at the General Headquarters, as during those days, another ruler was confronted with the same fateful question—and decided differently.
EmperorWilhelm II left Germany at its most perilous hour, stating that he was doing so out of love for his people and to spare them a civil war - a man who could utter such words must have felt, in the depths of his subconscious, that he, his people, and his state were not inseparably bound together, but could very well be separated.
Frederick the Great would never have allowed a mutiny on the grounds that his resistance to it might cost blood, and he would never have described the suppression of a revolt as a "civil war" - thus, in the tragic days of November 1918, a conception of the state collapsed—the purely dynastic conception of the state.

Frederick the Great, who watched over his people both during the war and in the subsequent years of peace, and who placed the interests of the people and the state above all else, was given a name by this people unlike any other a ruler has ever been given: he will continue to live on in German history as "The One and Only," a symbol of a concept of the state that has yet to be realized—one that can only be shaped in the new forms of the modern era.
Prussia's historical achievement, then, consists of nothing more and nothing less than the salvation of the entire German people: the Electorate of Brandenburg laid the foundation for the future German Reich, independent of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation, and Frederick the Great's state elevated the German people to the status of a formidable power among the other European nation-states.

4. The Democratic Concept of the State

Even in the time of Frederick the Great, however, the time had not yet come for that nationalist concept of the state, which is only now, in the midst of chaos, emerging from an inexplicable yet sudden sense of life that is taking hold across all social classes.
At the very time that Frederick the Great was apparently ruling Prussia as a despot, the absolutist, dynastic concept of the state in its western neighbor was heading toward its dissolution: its path paved by English Enlightenment philosophy and French sloganeering, the ideas of revolution and democracy grew ever stronger among France's thin, aristocratic, and disheveled upper class.

Here, it is probably necessary to distinguish between one form of democracy and another: the Nordic peoples have always detested despotism as a form of government, and even the great German emperors of the past were elected emperors.
In England, the idea of a self-renewing national government had already gained ground as early as the 13th century, and the struggles of Oliver Cromwell consistently reinforced that concept of popular representation in the face of unchecked absolutist encroachments - thus, from that organic, self-contained way of life—which had developed over centuries—emerged the form of English political life that other nations believed they could simply copy in the 19th century.
Just as in England, the organization of the robust will of the people is also taking shape in the Dutch territories; German municipal ordinances reflect this concept, and, as previously noted, this organic expression and assertion of the worldview of broad masses extends all the way down to northern Italy.
However, alongside this affirmation of the will of the people came the realization that the stronger this will, the greater the leader and his responsibility: the mayors of the free imperial cities and the lords of the Hanseatic League were, in their own way, dictatorial figures who knew no limits except the law.
This Nordic, organic concept of the necessary interdependence between the people and their leader is a concept that is rejected both by dynastic absolutism and by the Roman Empire of the German Nation (viewed as a system), but even more so by the so-called democratic idea of the 19th century, for while the other ideas fostered and demanded strong personalities, the democratic idea of the French Revolution is fundamentally based on the principle of the very destruction of personalities and the enthronement of the crude and chaotic principle of the masses.

While the so-called Great French Revolution may have had its internal justification purely as a revolt against a decaying and obsolete principle of statehood, the ideas it produced were not of an organic, state-forming nature; rather, they were the products of philosophers and armchair theorists far removed from the people, and the catchphrases of vain windbags and power-hungry speculators.
All those hackneyed intellectual fragments of the world revolution, which backward-thinking professors and big-city dwellers with calcified minds still flaunt today, have always met with failure wherever they have come to dominate - thus, those words—which embody liberty, equality, fraternity, humanity, humankind, progress, and all the associated treasures of a historical cabinet of curiosities—were bound to create a disastrous confusion in people's minds, since these concepts are all contradictory; one can rightly spare oneself the effort of refuting this fact, which is now self-evident.
The captivating trio of liberty, equality, and fraternity, however—the self-determination of peoples against tyranny—swept across all of Europe like a hypnotic aura, for the idea of the "Enlightenment" had taken hold of the broadest strata of society at the time and rendered them inwardly incapable of seriously fighting against the French tricolor as its symbol - thus, at the beginning of the 19th century, many Prussian officers found themselves in the position of having to fight against a flag that they themselves inwardly recognized as their own.

This betrayal of the people brought about the deserved punishment, which was finally followed by an awakening, and for the first time we see most German tribes united in the Wars of Liberation, consciously championing a great German ideal: the "ray of freedom from the north," as Theodor Körner once sang of it, became a sacrificial flame on the battlefields of Leipzig and at Waterloo.
However, it was still not strong enough to consciously carve out a space for itself against old traditions sanctified by centuries, and since the German Wars of Liberation, we have seen the dynastic concept of

the state in Germany struggle for dominance alongside the democratic one, which we see both being united in their persecution of the harbingers of a "people's state".

The Scharnhorsts and the Gneisenaus, Fichte—who had become a proponent of the "völkisch" ideology—and "Father of Gymnastics" Friedrich Ludwig Jahn were figures viewed with suspicion, even considering that German democracy, due to its predominantly German leadership, was still nationally minded; that changed when the pernicious influence of Judaism exploited the boundless ideas of democracy, and the great work of subversion began, leading to November 9th, 1918.
True, a Bismarck once again took up the legacy of Frederick the Great with a firm hand, and an age-old German dream of the unity of all Germans seemed to be coming true - and yet, that was not the case, for the unification of 1871, which brought Bavaria and Prussia under one state umbrella for the first time, had ultimately been more of a political unification than an ethnic one.
In foreign policy, they saw themselves united against France and Russia; they had cut themselves off from the Habsburg Empire and its un-German policies, but Germans still remained in Austria, and even in terms of domestic policy, the German Reich of 1871 was not yet a conscious nation-state.
Some prophets of that era—who would only be recognized as such in the decades to come—had recognized this, above all, Paul de Lagarde - amid the jubilation over the new Reich, he wrote in the 1880s:

"There has never been a German state."

This heretical statement fell on deaf ears at the time, but no one followed the failure of the "völkisch" idea with more conscious sorrow than Lagarde himself; nor did anyone else, as he did (in his *Deutsche Schriften* [*German Writings*]), point out the reasons that led him to his pessimistic view.

Bismarck, conscious of his own power, had himself planted the worm in the rafters of the German house, and nothing symbolizes this fact more shattering than the economic treaties following the Franco-Prussian War: there, on the French side, stands the name of the Jewish banker Rothschild, and on the German side, the name of the Jewish banker Bleichröder.
At the Congress of Berlin, Bismarck unfortunately allowed himself to be influenced by Bleichröder himself, as well as by the Alliance Israélite Universelle, with which he collaborated, and by Beaconsfield-d'Israeli: he advocated for the emancipation of the Jews in the Balkans, thereby strengthening the foreign-policy position of Jewish finance and, in turn, allowing it to exert further influence on German affairs.
The Jewish banker, already a dominant figure on the world stage at that time, thus entered that period of dominance which has made him the de facto leader of world politics today, though in no way does this diminishes the great man Bismarck's achievements by draw attention today to those cracks in the foundation of the German state that were already apparent back then.
Bismarck, with a vanishingly small minority, built the German Reich in the face of petty-bourgeois arrogance and democratic cowardice; he likely also considered himself strong enough to deal with Messrs. Bleichröder and Bamberger (he never made a secret of his antisemitism either) - however, by the time he stepped down, the tentacles of Jewish finance had grown so strong that the next Chancellor could no longer free the German people from their grip, and nor could his successors.

The age of the machine, with all its appalling consequences, brought about a further erosion of the nationalist ideal: the machine promoted world trade, brought about overindustrialization, and enabled high finance to conduct its business.
The age of the machine was at the same time the age of both theoretical and practical materialism: the materialist view of history, then, which ultimately reduced the human person to a product of the environment, was truly the worldview of the parliamentary, democratic 19th century, and continues to sweep across Europe even today in a tide of filth.
Out of this over-industrialization and the organized exploitation of all peoples, as well as the stock market frauds perpetrated by the central banks, arises the very question on which the future of Europe will depend—the Social Question: the German concept of the state as a protector of the people and labor, dictated solely by the interests of the nation—that is, a form of National Socialism that Bismarck said should be "drilled into the minds" of the people.
This concept of the state, however, was severed by communist-Marxist subversion.

5. Communism

The direct ideological consequence of plutocratic thought is Marxism, for in the ideas of human equality, the brotherhood of all peoples, and so-called humanistic ideals found an audience in the second half of the 19th century that provided the most fertile ground for such inorganic principles: on one hand, a large class of manual laborers, crammed into factories and mines, unable to grasp the meaning and purpose of their own products, who could understand their work only in materialistic terms without any deeper meaning; on the other, a coffeehouse and urban intelligentsia, likewise detached from real life, that has lost its spiritual balance and became the apostles of that corrosive and culture-destroying doctrine whose dreadful spiritual and political consequences are clearly evident today.
Added to these conditions was the natural drive for power and liberation among the oppressed classes, combined with a sense of social injustice that no words could refute: with this combination, it goes without saying that, given these conditions, a fanatical figure such as Karl Marx and a doctrine as ruthlessly focused on the destruction of Europe's present and past as Marxism could take ever deeper root among the dispossessed and the urban proletariat that had grown up in a crisis.
Thus, the nation-state was rejected and the International established as a new symbol; thus, human equality was proclaimed and individual personalities were set aside; thus, humanity was idolized to give the naked drive for power a more beautiful form, and thus, the class struggle was also scientifically justified as a system to strengthen the momentum of the Marxist battalions, and to unite them against the "oppressors" - at least that is what many leaders believed, and certainly the vast majority of those being led.

One might indeed think that a bitter, life-and-death struggle would have to break out between a democracy based purely on private capitalism and a Marxism aimed purely at depersonalization and communism; in reality, however, we see a completely different alignment of the warring parties throughout all these decades.
Plutocratic democracy has, in fact, allied itself with the so-called workers' party against the national parties (which, incidentally, also hold a purely private-capitalist orientation) - we thus observe the curious

fact that the purely political concept of the state had a much greater impact than the economic struggles, however brutally waged.
This can be easily explained to anyone examining the matter objectively by the fact that both the leaders of democracy and the actual leaders of Marxism were Jews; thus, despite all other explanations, the natural instinct of the Hebrew people was bound to have a similar effect, for as an international, nomadic banker and stock-market operator, he had to regard land-based industry and agriculture—which is likewise rooted in the land—as his mortal enemy, and therefore waged exactly the same struggle as the "Workers' Party," which enjoyed his special support and, over the course of decades, became the unwitting fighting force of the international Jewish stock markets against the national industries of all states.
It was the Jewish plutocracy that nurtured social democracy, provided it with theoretical resources, founded its newspapers, and built its union halls - thus, the Jewish plutocrat appeared as a friend of the workers, secured leadership of the "anti-capitalist" party, rendered it harmless to himself in this way, and thereby killed two birds with one stone.
To describe the relationship between the plutocratic and Marxist camps would fill volumes even today; I refer the reader to the bibliography listed at the end.

The united Marxist-democratic internationalist idea began to make its triumphant advance with increasing force in the heart of the Bismarckian Reich: at this time, there were few who had fully recognized the danger (Lagarde, Stoecker[5], and Dühring[6]), and the so-called national parties did not find the strength in time to root out the corruption within their own ranks in order to deprive Jewish Marxism's systematic agitation of its foundation.
The internationalist ideology was able to grow stronger and stronger because the rationalism of recent decades was, first, exclusively or almost exclusively dynastic in orientation, and second, focused solely on foreign policy: the conservative leadership claimed to be steadfastly defending German identity, but failed to find the courage—as loyal servants of the king—to represent the interests of the entire people, even at the expense of dynastic interests if necessary, and to prevent, through energetic and unsparing criticism, the damage that was gradually developing into catastrophes; this gave rise to the Byzantine intrigues that ultimately surrounded Emperor Wilhelm II, and into which, even in the best of atmospheres, no fresh breath of air could penetrate - thus, the last Emperor lived under false notions of time and the world, in a state of self-aggrandizement that, despite all his good will, did not give him the inner, steadfast conviction to regard himself as the embodiment of the state—a fact that became evident after the first trials of the Great War; the rift in the German imperial house deepened, and the edifice collapsed in 1918.
In foreign policy, the conservative, and later the Pan-German movement, seemingly championed German power interests with ruthlessness, yet this nationalist stance failed almost entirely in domestic politics, for the very same politician who called for a fierce struggle against Poland could not find sufficient words of condemnation when a fellow party member settled Polish workers on his estate because they were cheaper than German ones - thus, it was precisely due to a grave failure on the part of these same National Germans that the East was not Germanized, but rather Polonized; indeed, entire Polish villages sprang up in western industrial areas at a time when German laborers had to seek work far across the ocean to find employment, and German agricultural and industrial circles followed similar lines of thought.

[5] Adolf Stoecker, German theologian, court chaplain to EmperorWilhelm I, and avid antisemite. - The Translator
[6] Eugen Dühring, German philosopher, economist and avid antisemite. - The Translator

The German worker was not viewed as a fellow countryman to be protected in the highest interest of the state, but for the most part was seen as an economic commodity, with whom a closer bond was increasingly lost as industry expanded: in the face of these facts, nationalist propaganda failed to take hold and could not establish the deep roots necessary to reinforce among the Germans—who were already, by their very nature, inclined toward international ideas—their sense of a shared destiny with their compatriots; added to this was the fact that even the Christian churches in Germany did not see themselves as instruments for strengthening national consciousness, but rather as servants of anti-national interests.

The days of August 1914 were indeed a magnificent upsurge of age-old, merely buried instincts; the heroic deeds of the German people on the battlefield and at home will one day find a worthy historian to record them, but it must nevertheless be said that this same people was, after all, so sick as to surrender itself to a political leadership that did not represent the interests of the people, but rather the interests of international stock market speculators, democratic or purely confessional doctrinaires - thus it was possible for enemy propaganda to find fertile ground among the German people; thus it became possible for traitors within their own country not to be summarily executed by a German government, but rather to be called upon to share in the government: that is why it was also possible for the darkest day in German history—November 9th, 1918—to shatter the last pillars of the old German house.

Now we stand at a turning point in our destiny, and every German is faced with a difficult question: anyone who wishes in any way to come to terms with the events of our time will have to ask why things have turned out this way, where the causes of the collapse lie, what preconditions were in place that made the collapse possible, what ideas paved the way for the collapse, and what new synthesis of life, what new worldview, and what new resolve—with all its consequences—is necessary if the German people are to rise again.

One must acknowledge that engaging with politics today is not a light pastime for moments of leisure, but rather a matter of destiny that will prove decisive for generations to come - thus, addressing the question of the old and new concepts of the state is therefore today the primary prerequisite for every conscious German citizen.

The Political Parties

The Center Party and the Bavarian People's Party

The concept of a stateless Roman Empire of the German Nation is represented today by the Center Party and the Bavarian People's Party, which is currently separate from it in form.
Even though the concept of nationhood is too strong today for the Center Party and the Bavarian People's Party to do without it, they are nevertheless so bound by an international conception of the state that not a day goes by without their press—even in the midst of the most severe national struggles, such as those we face today—issuing warnings against "excessive nationalism," while one might think that no nationalism today could be passionate enough to finally forge the German people into a single, united bloc: the conventions of the Center Party and the Bavarian People's Party, as they have been held for years, finally reached the conclusion in 1923 that a consistent national ideology constitutes the latest and most dangerous heresy.
The *Augsburger Postzeitung*, the organ of the Bavarian People's Party, wrote (according to the Viennese *Neues Reich* of October 30th, 1921):

"The rationale for opposing the Habsburg dynasty has recently shifted—now that the accusations of treason against Germany no longer hold water—to the claim that the establishment of a Danube monarchy under the Habsburgs would pose a threat to the German Reich, which, should a Danube Confederation come into being, would also be cut off to the southeast - it is thus apparently German interests that prompt the German nationalists to oppose the Habsburgs and to promote the movement for annexation to the German Reich.
In reality, however, these ideas are also purely Prussian in orientation, for it is a narrow-minded interpretation of the Greater German ideal, and would amount to a return to a 'Small German' solution—simply setting aside the great traditions of the Roman Empire of the German Nation and renouncing any influence over the small eastern states beyond German Austria.
These are states that may well be influenced by France at the moment, as feared by the German nationalist camp, but whose economic needs inevitably point back to Germany time and again: we South Germans, in any case, have no interest in committing ourselves to a narrowly nationalist Germany."

The same internationalist spirit finds further expression in Austria's Christian Social Party: the fall of Charles, the last Habsburg, has not yet changed anything, and nothing is more characteristic than a testimony by Charles IV's last collaborator, Baron von Werkmann, in his book "Der Tote auf Madeira"(*The Dead Man on Madeira*).
The following words may serve to confirm just how little the Habsburg imperial house had to do with the German idea, as Werkmann writes:

"The Emperor (Franz Joseph) remained free of personal sentiments and resentments even regarding the German question: his relationship with the German Reich was determined not by anger over German unfriendliness or German intransigence, but by the real conflict of interests between Austria-Hungary and Germany...
To preserve the multi-ethnic state, Emperor Franz Joseph took up the sword—and for nothing else… For us, the war never had the meaning of a campaign for German hegemonic ambitions."

Immediately afterward, it is even emphasized that it was the Emperor's duty, in the interest of the idea of the state, to oppose German aspirations and stand against Germany.
Werkmann publishes notes by the last Habsburg, in which it states, among other things:

"The overly close connection between the state most in need of peace and the victors of the 1870–71 campaign—who had become a world power—was bound to burden Austria-Hungary with hostilities, the outcome of which could not have brought us any benefit, even if we had remained victorious alongside our allies..."

Later in the text, Archduchess Maria Josepha explains that she had no sympathy for pan-German goals: Empress Zita is remembered, who had the closest ties to the House of Parma, as is Prince Sixtus of Parma, of whom Mr. von Werkmann himself states that he wished for France's victory as much as any of his fellow citizens, and of whom it is emphasized that he had earned his Doctor of Law degree with a dissertation titled " Ein Bourbon immer Franzose sei" (*A Bourbon Is Always a Frenchman*).
This very same Prince Sixtus is portrayed by the "German" author as open-hearted, quick-witted, knowledgeable, tenacious, and—to top it all off—as the peace-loving prince who would have made a "particularly suitable mediator" between Vienna and Paris: these few flashes of insight alone suffice to shed light on the ideological and political underpinnings that have guided Habsburg policy uninterrupted to this very day.

We see exactly the same thing in the Bavarian People's Party, whose leader, Dr. Heim, for example, deemed it necessary, at a critical moment in Germany's history, to travel to meet with French General Desticker and negotiate with him regarding a possible secession of Bavaria from the German Reich. From a global political perspective, then, it is possible that a French power might insert itself between southern and northern Germany in order to bring about the destruction of the German Reich: in that case, it would be the self-evident duty of a South German politician to discuss with his North German compatriots the options for averting this calamity, but under no circumstances should a German man—especially the leader of the numerically dominant party in the Bavarian state—conduct separation talks with the French himself, for this is an act that every German would rightly assume would land the German negotiator in question before a public prosecutor once it became public knowledge - this, however, did not happen, and it reveals the political stance of the entire leadership of the Bavarian People's Party.
Added to this is the fact that it is possible to openly refer to Ludendorff and Hitler in the press as "guests" in Bavaria, or, as Pastor Vielberth[7] does in his treatise "Nationalsozialismus" (*National Socialism*), to speak of "North German emigrants." (I have discussed the Bavarian People's Party and the Center Party in greater detail in the work cited at the end.)
Due to this party-political sentiment—which can be regarded as separatist, and found classic expression in a speech by the same Mr. Vielberth, in which he said:

"First I am a Catholic, then a Bavarian, and then a German."

It is with this that those trials—of which Bavaria has had more than its share lately—were able to unfold.

[7] Wilhelm Vielberth, who was critical of National Socialism and published "Der Nationalsozialismus und die Religion" (National Socialism and Religion) in the *Augsburger Postzeitung* in December 1922. - The Translator

The Leoprechting trial[8] and the Fuchs-Machhaus scandal[9] are all too clear symptoms of how the Bavarian People's Party is viewed in French circles; added to this is the revelation by the French commissioner Tirard, which the *Observer* reproduced verbatim, and from which it emerged that the high traitor Dr. Dorten[10] had been in contact with Dr. Heim in Munich—indeed, that even the Bamberg Program of the Bavarian People's Party had been a direct consequence of the influence exerted by the French representative in Munich, Monsieur Dard.
It is telling that this report was simply withheld from readers by the Munich-based organ of the Bavarian People's Party, the *Bayeschen Kurier*, and that, furthermore, virtually no response was given to the allegations raised - for the time being, therefore, only one conclusion remains: that the *Observer*'s revelation essentially corresponds to the truth, though nevertheless, no public prosecutor—who is otherwise so eager to catch the little guys red-handed—has come forward to prosecute the leader of the Bavarian People's Party.

There is not much to say about the Center Party: under Erzberger's leadership, it began quite openly to work alongside treasonous, anti-national Marxism to bury the German Reich, and Wirth's policy of appeasement toward the Jew Rathenau forms a single thread pointing toward the abyss of German national politics.
The worldview of the Center Party and its kindred spirits knows no concept of the nation-state; it knows no consistent advocacy of national ideals and national interests, but instead relegates these—and even then only reluctantly—to second and third place, whereby it matters not whether individual voters think differently, since the leadership as such has always decided, and the flock has always provided loyal support.

The Democrats

The Democrats of the mid-19th century, who began a struggle against the age of Metternich in the 1840s, were nationalists through and through, even as they parroted the ideals of the French Revolution day and night - however, the consequences of this unnational system, as such were bound to unfold in this way as internationalization progressed, and all those sensitive intellectuals—who viewed the struggle for existence as an evil—raved about rights, brotherhood, and justice in order to drown out the warning voice of the times.

Karl Christian Planck, one of those thinkers who are today regarded as classics of democratic thought—even though they would surely have had little in common with today's all-Jewish "democracy"—provides us with a symbolic example from that harsh era when the German Reich was forged, for even Karl Christian Planck speaks mockingly in all his works of the "merely national" idea

[8] A trial conducted in July 1922 that convicted Baron Hubert von Leoprechting of high treason against the Bavarian state for being a paid agent in French interests; he was later held "in protective custody" in 1935 and was sent to a concentration camp, where he died in Mauthausen in 1940. - The Translator
[9] A failed coup conducted by writer and theater director Georg Fuchs and former editor-in-chief of the *Völkischer Beobachter,* Hugo Machhaus; the French connection is that Machhaus was receiving French funds between 1922 and 1923, though whether this was done with Hitler's knowledge is debatable. - The Translator
[10] Hans Adam Dorten, German career lawyer who sided with the French during the Ruhr occupation as a separatist leader; he later fled to Nice, France in 1923 following the failure to establish a Rhenish state. - The Translator

and raves about the true universal tasks, about the "legal and global vocation of the Germans," and declares:

"To this day, however, the fulfillment of Germany's lofty international destiny—its vocation to be an organically shaping and unifying center—has been impossible, due to the immaturity of both foreign nations and its own."

"It is the new Prussian nation-state that, through the very nature of its founding, has provided the impetus for the general and final expansion of military power… No one whose sense of Germany's destiny has not been lost in the national delusion will praise those who have brought about this current state of affairs."

Just as with our pacifists today, according to Karl Christian Planck, all other nations have the right to self-defense and armament—except the Germans, as he says:

"It was well understood in the summer of 1870 that isolation from enemies on all sides was inevitable; this is therefore the necessary consequence of continuing down the current, purely national path. No matter how innocent and peaceful we Germans may appear, the natural course of events is stronger than any mere will or opinion: already, the violent external and military concentrations have aroused a mistrust and jealousy that would never be possible in an uprising born of the free spirit of the people and sustained by new ideas of justice—an uprising through which the German spirit has risen to the forefront of a general and unifying German and European movement."

These words express that unworldly, yet ridiculously presumptuous, democratic wisdom—the view that a legal will is truly a will only if it is prepared to defend and enforce that right.

When Germany began its campaign for unification in 1870, this democratic political thinker (whose legal concepts, incidentally, are certainly worthy of sympathy) delivered a major speech to the German soldiers in the gymnasium at Blaubeuren, stating that:

"...there must be an end, once and for all, to the eternal strife and state of war…; no mere national power or strength can put an end to this, nor prevent jealousy and selfish strife, mistrust, and hostile armament from beginning again and again! This can never be achieved by national means alone; only the truly German spirit is capable of it."

"But let us be worthy of their blood [that of the Swabian emperors] and their sacrifice; let us do our utmost to build what we are called to build—not merely a nation-state like any other, not a new source of envy and jealousy - no, only the newly emerging, sacred, and humanly great Reich of the German Nation."

One can imagine what would have become of the war of 1870–71 if, instead of a Bismarck, a "knight of the sad countenance" like Karl Christian Planck had been at the helm.
This entire professorial and humanitarian arrogance of a true-blue democrat—always speaking of a "mere" nation-state, as if the national were merely an unpleasant afterthought to the wonderful democratic

system—is characteristic of the entire democratic sentiment against which the German Reich was once built, and against which a nationalistic Germany will one day arise.

This vile, anti-German spirit, however, continued to propagate itself, became more pitiful with each passing decade, and ultimately fell entirely into the hands of the masterminds behind the *Berliner Tageblatt* and the *Frankfurter Zeitung* as an instrument of Jewish world politics: Walter Schücking[11] and Professor Quidde[12] are the direct continuation and atrophy of a Karl Christian Planck, and at the very moment when all the enemies of the German people are joining forces to strangle it, these men (if one may still use that term) plead with the League of Nations, the League for Human Rights, and other fraudulent organizations, as if help could ever come from there.
That Germany is now enduring its current fate is a just punishment for its crime of having followed ideologues like Karl Christian Planck even a single step down the path of their politics, and for having, thanks to this suppression of the national instinct, surrendered itself to deceivers and traitors - thus, a reawakening can only occur when all these traitors—from 1789 through 1848, to the delusion of the League of Nations—are finally cast aside with scorn and derision.

The Social Democrats

As already explained, the democratic ideal found its logical extension in Marxism.
The Social Democratic camp drew in all those disappointed by the existing system, and the more this disappointment grew, the more radical this wing of democratic thought became - thus, during the war, the opposition split into the Independent Social Democratic Party, which went on to give rise to the Communist Party after the 1918 revolt.

Marxism as a whole constitutes a single worldview and differs, if at all, only in the means employed by its various parties to implement it: among its most radical representatives, therefore, what is commonly referred to as the Marxist conception of the state is most clearly embodied, and there is scarcely a more unequivocal commitment to Marxism than the new Bolshevik program of early summer 1922.
Following a lengthy critique of the entire state of the global economy and world politics, this new Communist Manifesto concludes with the words:

"Should Bolshevism triumph, the state would wither away and give way to communist society."

In these words, the entire nomadic character of the Marxist worldview is revealed in a monumental way, and it becomes clear that Marxism is by no means a concept of the state, but rather represents the denial of any concept of the state - thus, from this worldview, one chaos after another will always arise if the proponents of this doctrine—which destroys both the state and the people—somehow come to power and, in doing so, cede leadership to those Jewish forces to whom they have entrusted themselves thus far.

Conservatives and German Nationalists

[11] German liberal politician and supporter of international courts. - The Translator
[12] Ludwig Quidde, German professor and prominent pacifist during the First World War. - The Translator

The German National People's Party and the German People's Party, as the successors to the former Conservatives and National Liberals, still embody the party-political manifestation of the dynastic concept of the state, for even before the war, they approached contemporary issues of world politics and ideology with a deeply entrenched rigidity, and were content to counter every development with a negative protest.
Instead of fearlessly and decisively directing criticism at the undeniable abuses of pre-revolutionary Germany, they contented themselves with loud threats and, often, nothing but empty rejections of the Social Democratic opposition: the result was the steady growth of the Marxist movement.

For years, this movement brought together not only those who consciously sought to destroy the German Reich, nor merely empty talkers and ideologues, but also men who felt that a fundamental break with the old order was necessary, yet who themselves had not yet conceived a new, positive synthesis of the state, and were unable to grasp the ultimate consequences of the Marxist system.
For these men, social democracy was a militant party fighting for social justice and human dignity, and many talented writers unwittingly placed themselves at the service of a system that brought about the downfall of the German Reich - the German Nationalists, however, have learned virtually nothing from the 1918 Revolution either, and believe that, by perpetually emphasizing their loyalty to the Emperor, this loyalty is the true force that could once again bring them to power.
Still lacking understanding, they continue to wage the political-national struggle on the wrong front, confusing the legitimate labor movement with the Marxist leadership, and are even more willing to make compromises with the latter than to draw closer to the former.
The very same men who held high government offices before and during the war and wielded state power, yet were unable to ward off the impending disaster, are still members of the German National People's Party today, and it is madness to believe that these men, under circumstances a thousand times more difficult, would be capable of achieving anything greater than they did before.

Although the German National People's Party emphasizes its strictly national, indeed ethno-national, orientation, this commitment is very superficial, because its ties to the democratic plutocracy continue to exist, and the burden of the past is so heavy that free action is unthinkable and ruthless determination cannot be expected - thus, like the other political parties in the Reichstag, the German National People's Party is a relic of a bygone era—it is strong enough to cause difficulties for the new state synthesis of the present, but too weak to provide it with any real support.

The People's Concept of the State

In contrast to all contemporary political parties—which are the product of state concepts from the Middle Ages, the 18th, and the 19th centuries—a new synthesis of the state is emerging from the collapse and chaos.

The merely negative opposition to the old concept of the state had triumphed in 1918, and the fact that it triumphed in this way proves that the old state was indeed ripe for collapse - now, however, the old and remarkable fact is becoming apparent: that two different currents or personalities can be united in fighting a common enemy, only to drift apart again immediately upon victory.
The democratic Reich of Wilhelm II was opposed by the Social Democratic opposition and by a small handful of men denounced as “Pan-Germans”: shortly before the November Revolt, there were also plans to stage a “völkisch” revolution from above and to remove the weak Emperor, who was at the mercy of the Ballins and Rathenaus; however, it turned out that the anti-state Social Democrats proved to be stronger, because there were too few men on the “völkisch” side, and their inhibitions were still too great.
After the collapse, voices rose within the Social Democratic camp that very quickly recognized this entire revolution as a betrayal of the entire suffering German people, and they cursed the day they had come to the aid of Ebert and Scheibemann: these men sensed the immense global deception, yet they were unclear as to where the actual deceivers were to be found.
Instead of recognizing the background and consequences of the deception even at that early stage, they staggered for a time toward the far-left wing of the Bolsheviks, and thus all the active forces of the German working class coalesced within the Communist Party.
Is in all active movements, however, the Communist Party was a mixture of desperate elements—not just infrequently adventurers, but also consisting of, in part, those elements of the German working class who not only draft resolutions at the conference table, but are also willing to fight on the barricades for the views they hold to be true: this fact, in any case, presupposes a spiritual strength that has been lost to all our democratic parties.
This finest force of the German people is being misled and deceived; the challenge of German domestic politics, then, is to make clear to the representatives of this uniquely energetic segment of the German working class the deception that the entire Marxist system represents, and to point out to them their indissoluble bond with all their fellow countrymen; it must be made clear to them that the divide between the social classes must never become so sharp and gaping that it is capable of tearing apart the sense of national unity.

The bitter experiences with the International did indeed offer the opportunity to make German workers aware of this, but it was difficult to truly strengthen this awareness because the parties of the so-called national right were unwilling to make the necessary concessions: in a completely inappropriate display of arrogance, the so-called national parties pointed the finger squarely at German workers as the sole culprits for Germany’s current misery, and in doing so, they forgot that not only the Marxist concept of class struggle, but also the class and social snobbery of certain “upper” circles was partly to blame for the fact that the idea of class struggle was able to take such deep root.
Added to this was the fact that the entire so-called national right, although it still spoke of the fatherland in foreign policy, was still conducting its domestic policy along the same purely economic lines: the problems of German domestic policy were viewed purely from the standpoint of profitability, and not

from the standpoint of protecting the people and the race - herein lay—and still lies today—the fundamental error of the conservatives, the German nationalists, and by far the largest part of German big business.
A new movement that set itself the goal of saving the German people therefore had to first ask itself the question of who was to blame for the collapse, and then answer this question from a pan-German standpoint, without any regard for individual interests or the existing party or power structure; it had to recognize that such a salvation could not be achieved through compromises with traditions that were internally obsolete and rotten, nor through a compromise with the leaders of high treason.
The problem thus presented itself as a union of the national, ethnic concept of power and the unconditional demand for social justice - recognizing, however, that social justice remains nothing more than an empty slogan if it simply amounts to charity or private welfare, the unconditional demand had to be made that, instead of handouts from above, there must be unconditional recognition of the state's duty, for a sense of duty on the part of the individual citizen toward the state may be demanded only if the state, in turn, recognizes and fulfills a duty toward each individual citizen.
In other words, the idea of state socialism must replace the Marxist concept, thereby defining National Socialism as social justice for all strata of the German people, without distinction of class, based on the recognition of the national duty and its implementation with the aid of state power: through this realization, the labor movement—which existed long before Marxism—has been set back on the right track, and a new and necessary expression of contemporary European life, which had been disrupted and betrayed by a Jewish system hostile to Germany and Europe—Marxism—is once again asserting its rights.

Foreign policy means the establishment of ethnic power and the safeguarding of the whole; socialism then means domestic policy, that is, the safeguarding of the individual.
Based on these lines of thought, the movement founded in Munich in 1919 called itself National Socialist, and with this designation, it tied itself to the already existing party organizations in Austria and the Sudetenland, although it certainly does not teach a development stemming from Marxism, but rather, on the contrary, a development against Marxism and based on the concept of the people's state.
Thus, the concept of the people's state rests on three pillars: the protection of the people and the race, the idea of social justice, and—recognizing that all of this can be enforced and maintained only through power—the idea of national self-defense.
No single political party on the continent has yet seriously embraced the idea of placing the protection of the people and the race at the forefront of all questions of worldview and public life, as all attempts to form the nation-state were overrun by economic ties in the course of the 19th century.

Today, there is still not a single nation-state in the entire world who adheres to this fundamental worldview, although it may sometimes appear so in terms of foreign policy.
The spirit of the Jewish, usurious-capitalist associations that today determines global politics must, of course, take the character of the peoples into account and seek to win over the hysterical and fanatical French with different propaganda methods than those used for the cosmopolitan Germans and the romantically inclined Russians: that is why the major Jewish press in France, England, Italy, and also in North America, adopts a highly nationalistic stance, whereas in Germany, Jewry stands at the forefront of subversion and international undermining; because this is the case, we are faced, following the end of the Great War, with the undeniable fact that both the "victors" and the vanquished have lost the war.

Defeated Germany is already, quite clearly, a colony of international banking powers, while the victorious nations now have to pay their bankers ten times more in taxes than they did before the war: this means that all states have become liable to pay interest to those powers that financed the wars and, in return, collect interest from the respective peoples—interest at such a high rate that these peoples are unable to pay it.

Thus, in the final analysis, the Great War itself turns out for the most part to have been a speculation by the Western stock market powers, and the so-called nation-states were just as much swept up in it and misled by their so-called governments as the German Reich, which was led toward catastrophe thanks to its incompetent political leadership; this happened because the idea of a nation-state had not gained a foothold in any of the Western powers, despite all the talk about the nation-state.

In foreign policy, nationalism was indeed emphasized in its sharpest form, but in domestic policy, however, empty rhetoric and the deception of equal rights for all citizens prevailed, as did the purely formal concept of the state derived from the intellectual arsenal of the French Revolution: nowhere in the capitalist democracies was there any mention of the protection of race or people, and thus, the "vivid demon of humanity's decline" (as coined by Richard Wagner) crept into all states "legally" and, everywhere, crowned as a symbol of an era of decline the betrayal that all the peoples of Europe had committed against their own essence.

After the conclusion of the war, which had been waged by whipping up all national passions, it became apparent that this could not be done without consequences, and the idea of the nation-state—which had been defended in foreign policy—became, for the first time, a real problem for domestic policy as well - thus, in two countries, two movements arose at the same time and independently of one another, movements that have often been compared to one another and, indeed, share much in common: Fascism in Italy, and National Socialism in Germany.

Fascism, like National Socialism, had recognized that there could now be no compromise whatsoever with Marxism—an international organization that was rarely a truly nationalist movement—but that this international movement also had to be overcome and its organization eradicated; the passionate Italians thus moved more quickly to action than the more cautious Germans, and everywhere in Italy, under Mussolini's leadership, organizations sprang up that, following the initial collapse of the Bolshevik experiment in Italy, engaged in open combat with the Marxist storm troops.

The Fascists succeeded in defeating them, and the struggle ended with Mussolini's triumphal march on Rome in late October 1922: it would take us too far afield to examine the activities of the Fascists in greater detail here, but suffice it to say that they succeeded in establishing an unprecedented governmental authority throughout the country, and that, for the first time, national interests were in fact vigorously represented by a government—even in domestic policy—alongside certain social necessities.

And yet, National Socialism knows that Italian Fascism is still far from grasping the full implications of the great struggle at hand, and in particular has not yet recognized that, in the long run, it serves no purpose to combat only the consequences without also making clear to the entire people the cause of those consequences that must be combated: Fascism still lacks the insight that the very international private and stock-market capitalism—against which even Fascism has not shied from fighting—was and remains the very element that has fueled all Marxist propaganda throughout the world; that a community of interests between Marxism and international loan capital has existed and still exists — namely, to make land-based national industries dependent on mobile loan capital — and Fascism has not yet grasped that this common

interest is symbolized by the fact that the leadership of both forces lies almost exclusively in the hands of Jewish usurers, or of a few individuals subservient to Jewish money.
The danger for Fascism in Italy lies in the fact that, although it has achieved a great victory thanks to one individual, it does not yet represent an ideological system strong enough to give hope that it would survive Mussolini's death; the danger also already exists today that Jewish stock-market capitalism naturally takes the new force into account as such and, recognizing that it cannot be directly opposed, approaches Fascism as a false friend, as signs of this are evident everywhere today.
At the same time, it must unfortunately be noted that the Fascist leaders are welcoming these false friends and making the grave mistake that Prince Bismarck, unfortunately, also committed at the Congress of Berlin when he granted influence to Bleichroeder and his comrades: when the strong man died, the lesser figures fell into the trap of an economic system of exploitation, from which the entire world is suffering; thus, even today, the social and national struggle continues under a false banner.

Throughout Europe then, only National Socialism has truly taken the idea of the people's state seriously, combating not only the consequences of Marxism and parliamentary democracy, but also their causes - those causes are: the materialistic view of the world and history characteristic of the 19th century; the entire feeble and powerless democratic theory of the state; the notion that the economy and money are destined to be a determining factor in political life rather than a serving one, and the dominance of the merchant spirit, which is embodied in Judaism.
Because National Socialism drew these conclusions and also openly articulated and defended them, it had to contend with a greater number of enemies than Fascism, for not only was it opposed by the entire organized Jewish world press, representing both democracy and Marxism, but it also had to contend with the incredible lukewarmness and cowardice within the so-called national camp and against the economic circles dependent on high finance: it had to fight against both the left and the right.
Like every new idea, it had the whole world as its enemy, and it brought with it nothing but the conviction that it had indeed created a new synthesis of the state, one that corresponded to the innermost spirit of the present, and one that ruthlessly and honestly identified the errors of the past; it possessed the fanatical will to preach and bring this new synthesis of the state to fruition, and it knew that behind this synthesis of the state stood the finest forces of German history—the finest ideas that had once been alive in the state of Frederick the Great, the very same driving forces that had brought freedom to Germany in 1813, and which, though buried and mocked, still flared up in 1914.
With this conviction, an open struggle was launched in 1919 which, looking back on it now, must have seemed almost desperate amid all the hostile forces, for in all matters of life, a new criterion was suddenly established: one no longer asked whether a measure corresponded to a democratic, Marxist, or religious ideal, nor whether a measure could support the monarchy or the republic as forms of government, but only whether this or that measure serve the interests of the German people, regardless of social class.
From this perspective, 25 points were formulated, which seemed—and still seem—contradictory to many people because they were unable to grasp the central idea underlying them.

The recognition of racial driving forces also gave rise to—if not created, then at least supported—a new way of viewing history: from this perspective, the world history of the Indians, Greeks, and Romans did not present itself as a struggle between classes, nor as a series of random power struggles, not merely as a chronology, but as the result of racial and ethnic impulses.

The entire body of factual material accumulated from the past—which, viewed through the lens of previous historical research, had become increasingly incomprehensible—suddenly yielded a satisfying result, and the rise and fall of the Eastern peoples and ancient Rome revealed themselves as the ebb and flow of certain racial forces and national ideals; this new conception of history also began to have a liberating effect on the understanding of religion and created a new criterion for evaluating forms of government.

While the Middle Ages fought under the banner of Protestantism on one side and Catholicism on the other, and while the 18th and 19th centuries were guided by the watchwords "republic" and "monarchy," all of these have become symbols of the past - now, today, the question is: internationalism or nationalism.

And just as in earlier centuries where the warring camps created symbols for themselves, so too has the present age—in which minds are once again divided into two camps—created symbols for itself: on the one hand, as the crowning symbol of the international ideal, stands the red flag bearing the Soviet star, and on the other hand, there is the ancient Indo-European symbol of ascending life, the swastika.

Future struggles will play out under these symbols, and one of them will have to be defeated and torn to shreds, for one symbolizes international racial disintegration and the collapse of all European culture, and the other signifies the victory of those forces that alone have created cultural values over the course of millennia: this idea alone will make a national rebirth possible.

From this central experience follows, as a matter of course, not only a different perspective on history, but also a fundamental change in outlook in all areas of life.

As far as citizenship is concerned, the concept of the people's state leads to the rejection of today's purely formal definition of citizenship: according to the new conception, a citizen of Germany may be only one who, first, is free from Asian-Jewish blood, and second, has earned it through his conduct in life to the point of maturity - thus, citizenship is not merely a gift of birth, but must also be earned.

The distinction between residents and citizens is thus also clearly drawn for the first time, necessitating a careful separation of those who actively participate in public life.

However, the protection of the people and the race must not be limited to these material safeguards, but rather, it must take preventive measures, particularly in schools and the educational system: from this new synthesis arises, as a natural necessity, a turning away from our entire current educational system, which, on the one hand, has become an accumulation of dead knowledge, and on the other, has served not German ideals, but abstract doctrines.

In the idealization of the humanistic gymnasium, one had overlooked, in a state of naivety, that this so-called humanistic—that is, purely human—educational system was, in the final analysis, not a truly humanistic one at all, but was based on Greek national character; the Greek educational system, however, was rooted in race and, initially, served only the purpose of shaping Greeks according to the ideal image of the Greek soul.

Only this Greek attitude toward life created Hellenic culture, and today's purely abstract thinking is not only non-humanistic, but also not Greek, and is a blatant mockery of the Greek-national premises - thus, in a sad imitation of a Greek spirit that is, admittedly, related to ours in some respects, we have shifted the center of gravity of our lives from within ourselves to the outside world; we have used the standards of another people to measure our own achievements, and in doing so have forgotten that neither individuals nor peoples can ever be measured by the same yardstick.

Just as Michelangelo cannot be measured by the standards of Phidias, so too should the Strasbourg Cathedral not be regarded as a development of the Parthenon, for if one applies Greek standards to a Gothic cathedral, it becomes the most hideous monstrosity in the world; likewise, a Greek temple would seem alien to a Gothic architect.

Thus we witness the truly grotesque spectacle of our scholars knowing by heart the 300 tribes and racial mixtures of India, being well-versed in every pottery shard in Asia Minor and Syria, yet reports on the racial history of Europe have only appeared in the last few decades, reports that have focused the interest of foreign continents on the motherland: a clear understanding of the nature of the European world of peoples and the spiritual and physical foundations of the present has only become available in recent years.

In reaction to the humanistic educational system, the 19th century created a purely realistic one: now, the Germanic ideal stands as the dominant force in opposition to both, and an understanding of and respect for our own mythological past and our own history will form the primary prerequisite for more firmly anchoring the coming generation in the ancestral soil of Europe.

Closely linked to the educational system, a new conception of law is also taking shape - here, nothing is more gratifying than the fierce battle now being waged by a German conception of law against the Roman legal code.

Late Roman law, with its purely capitalist orientation—which today legally protects the exploiter from the exploited—has been fundamentally rejected for the first time, and in its place stands the ancient German conception of the cooperative system and, specifically, of state and racial protection.

No matter which field one may turn to after experiencing this new synthesis, everywhere the life of the past and the present appears from a different perspective, and different necessities arise for shaping the future.

We have already experienced many upheavals in European life; many a revolution and Reformation has swept across the ancient soil of our continent, but for the first time in our history, a new and fundamental rejection of the most important questions of life is emerging; much of what people bowed to for centuries without daring to criticize is today not only rejected inwardly, but already dismissed outwardly as a matter of course, because people have become aware that the old gods have long since become idols, and that we are living in a time of a new spiritual rebirth.

In the life of the individual, this development typically unfolds in such a way that, following a semi-unconscious, instinctive phase, there comes a period of restless searching, skepticism, and mockery - and yet, after this period of bewilderment, a new phase begins in which, at a higher level of consciousness, knowledge reconnects with the unchanging instinct, thus finally entering the age of maturity.

On the whole, something similar seems to unfold—if not always, then at least sometimes—in the life of nations, and we believe that Europe, and Germany in particular, finds itself today in a time of such a reconnection: after the stifling of an instinctively lived existence; after the romantic dreams of earlier centuries; after skepticism; after the Enlightenment, mockery, and materialism, our people are entering a time when they are beginning to outgrow their childhood and bid farewell to their rebellious years.

What has now become a clear reality for millions is nothing other than the fact that reason, insight, and instinct have found common ground on a new platform, and from this a rebirth is emerging—one we can already designate today as the “ethnic worldview”—which necessarily also results in the birth of a new concept of the state - thus, in this recognition of the root of our entire existence, the protection of the

nation and the race appears as the beginning and end of every German conception of the state, as the first requirement of a future free Germany.

Second in importance to this new concept of the state is a term that, due to the demagoguery of the past hundred years, has acquired a bad reputation in the widest circles, for never has there been more talk of "social justice" than in a time of the most terrible social hardship and corruption.
This concept of social justice was bound to remain a lie during the past decades of democracy, because the entire period was steeped in a materialistic view of the state and history, because the age of the machine had brought about an economic catastrophe without parallel, and because in no state had the concept of the protection of the people and the race—in its particular aspects as well as in its entirety—truly become the driving force behind everything: for this reason, the two strands that had finally come together in National Socialist thought did not converge in social and political life.
Anti-social nationalism failed to find its way into the suffering strata of the German people, and un-national Marxism found no connection to the German essence - thus, only through the fusion of national identity and socialism by means of a new idea is it possible to meet modern necessities while drawing upon all that German history has produced in terms of greatness; while the call for social justice—even when coming from anti-German circles—was merely a demagogic tool, today, born of the hardships of the present and under the banner of a new synthesis, it has become a goal of the German struggle for freedom.

The third pillar of this new ideology is the will to power - admittedly, Democrats and those sympathetic to them all claim they wanted the best, but that circumstances were too difficult to bring it about; however, in doing so, they forget—or refuse to acknowledge—that they did not truly want it.
They may have wished for it, and they may have whispered many things to one another in private, but the moment they failed to kindle the will to power to put this supposed desire into action, it was bound to remain mere feeble rhetoric - thus, what was glorified was not the creative power of a person or a people—which, driven by the feeling of creating something new, surges forward against all obstacles—but rather rootless, abstract notions of humanity, the brotherhood of man, and other fine ideals.
Even the best attempts came to naught because they lacked strong faith and, consequently, firm will - in contrast, from the very first day, National Socialism declared itself to be a militant movement, for being aware that a new and great idea is never tolerant or liberal, it also made its appearance as an intolerant force.
It was criticized for this, and it was accused of brutality in the defense of its views, yet people were forced to submit more and more to its synthesis: it was hated, and it was precisely because of this hatred that people were forced to recognize it as a new factor in Germany's political life, whether they wanted to or not.
National Socialism has not allowed itself to be deterred by anything thus far, nor will it do so in the future, for it has declared that, fully aware of being the sole powerful representative of the honorable and patriotic segment of the German people, it is prepared to inextricably link its own fate to that of the entire German people: just as Frederick the Great once wrote after the tragic day of a lost battle that he would not sign a dishonorable peace, even if he had to take everything bearing the name of Prussia with him to the grave, so too have the leaders of National Socialism made it unequivocally clear that they will either bring the new concept of the state to victory once and for all—despite all opposition and inevitable disappointments—or, if necessary, go down with the entire German people.

If a people, in the most trying hours of its fate, has no answer to questions of life and death and merely laments, while at the same time—for the most part, which dominates the rest—engages in dishonorable haggling and speculation, then, viewed from any standpoint, it is not worthy of continuing to exist: either the community of blood and destiny comprising 70 million Germans will finally be recognized and the necessary conclusions drawn, or else a hodgepodge of individuals who happen to speak German will continue to vegetate in Central Europe, and in that case, it is high time to divide this hodgepodge among a number of states with a more legitimate right to exist.

Two consequences arise immediately from this ethno-nationalist, Greater German concept: the notion of a "Bavarian people", as opposed to a "Prussian people" must disappear, for there is only one Prussian tribe and one Bavarian tribe, both of which belong to the German people; the concept of the German people is thus placed in its proper position and elevated above tribal concepts.

This is intended to prevent, once and for all, any talk of a "Prussian people" in the same way one might speak of a "French" or "English" people, for in exactly the same way, the concept of so-called Catholic or Protestant peoples must disappear, for there are no such peoples, but merely peoples of the Catholic or Protestant faith: if we retain the earlier misleading concept, Bavaria, France, and Italy will suddenly be pitted against Prussia, England, and Scandinavia, and the divide through the body of the German people will be drawn in a manner similar to that sought by the class-struggle slogan of Marxism.

Many more clarifications of concepts and views must yet take place, but they will gradually arise of their own accord with the victory of the great idea: wherever the new synthesis takes root, it will, on the one hand, have to apply critical scrutiny and, on the other, find a new affirmation for the German future.

German National Socialism fights for nothing other than the preservation of German national character and the shaping of its future, but since this great struggle also encompasses problems that are currently afflicting all of Europe—and which Europe is partly striving in vain to solve—it will ultimately bring about a solution to these problems for all of Europe as well.

As mentioned, there is not yet a single nation-state in Europe, because the true consciousness of the nation-state ideal has not yet fully taken root in any people; instead, today there exists an international community of interests among certain economic circles that transcends all nationalities, and today there also exists a world politics influenced purely by international forces, with the goal of a world republic, a world syndicate—specifically in the form of a private syndicate, as Walter Rathenau once called for at the Cannes Conference.

The international idea of the Jewish world stock exchange, linked to the world revolution, is today at the height of its power, and yet this idea is already struggling for its very existence, for—though still invisible in many states, and in some it is already gaining momentum, while National Socialism has fundamentally seen through it—the international idea's strongest opponent is rising, and the task of National Socialism in world politics is to wrest one state after another from today's system of world political power: in the end, the goal is not to unite a system of nations under a single international leadership, but to establish organic, national state systems based on race.

Two mortal enemies can use the same words and yet strive for the opposite - thus, when today the international banks and international conferences speak of the League of Nations and the "Reorganized States of Europe," this is the exact opposite of what would be meant, for example, if National Socialism were to speak of a rapprochement among the extreme nationalists of the European peoples, for only when

one truly respects, cultivates, and elevates one's own personality will one also possess respect for the independent lives of others—but never if one denies the personality as such or regards it as a mere means. Of course, there is no point in presenting possible or utopian ideas here, as one must merely point to the core of the struggle and to this symbol—the swastika—which has already been described, and which must one day triumph in all European states.

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In all intellectual and political camps, a process of ferment is constantly underway, and the pillars upon which the German people seemed to rest securely are being put to the test, as fate repeatedly demands when a nation has become untrue to itself.

For every true seeker, there comes a moment when thinking and struggling suddenly become an experience, and from that moment on, the present, the past, and the prospects for the future appear to him in a completely different light than before; he may not yet have been able to create a firm foundation for his life, but he has set out in a new direction.

It is a remarkable phenomenon for anyone witnessing the struggle of world-shaking forces that, from camps that once stood alien and hostile to one another, individuals—first sporadically, then with increasing frequency—emerge and walk a common path; they draw closer to one another and discover that the inner and outer barriers seem to have been swept away, and in their place, brotherly hands reach out to one another.

What we are witnessing today is that what we call the "ethnic worldview", which suddenly becomes, for all who have once experienced it, an idea that rises like a dome over the entire organic national identity.

We see that denominational differences are scarcely a factor in ethnic circles anymore; we see that no one objects to another's form of faith, because they know and feel that—no matter how much foreign tinsel may still flutter around it today—it is, at its core, rooted in the ethnic spirit; we see that a new idea is capable of melting away a seemingly ineradicable class mentality, that representatives of all social classes are able to come together seamlessly in a shared experience and common aspiration, and can work together.

A new formation, however, is sensitive to any structure of a different nature, and a foreign element—that is, an entity that does not share the same spiritual orientation—is perceived more clearly as such than in times when there was only inner chaos, superficial strife, and a hardening of the spirit - thus, a new idea always emerges in a combative, commanding, and law-making manner, for it knows no tolerance of everything, nor does it know any convention, because it carries its own new, organic law within itself

Thus, today the national worldview stands as a young entity amidst old structures and—born out of necessity, out of despair, out of inner conversion, and out of spiritual self-reflection—asserts its right, which was born with it.

In the realization and experience that everything of value in our culture springs from that mysterious center known as the national soul, the impulse to affirm and deny has arisen anew, as it has so often—under different circumstances—throughout history.

In the struggle against external influences, in the process of fusion between Celts, Germanic peoples, and Slavs—which gave birth to the multifaceted yet unified German people—the interplay of life forces was at work for centuries: in the past—in the 19th century—we had lost the capacity to perceive this, and for

this, we are paying the price today; now we are alive again and taking another step toward self-realization in the form of our time.
We acknowledge kindred external influences, enriching both ourselves and them, but we ruthlessly reject what we perceive as a poison harmful to us - thus, for example, for one who has sensed what a national worldview means, the so-called Old Testament naturally falls from one's shoulders, as to him, the hybrid constructs that overgrew Roman law appear as parasitic plants to be eradicated; one-sided humanism and classicism fade away; economic struggles and the drives underlying them take on a different appearance, and the entire struggle up to now turns out to have been waged on the wrong front and to our own ruin: the character of world and national politics now, today, proves to be alien and hostile to us.

A new spirit encompasses all things when it is true and draws fine nourishment from a living root: that is why all other intellectual currents, parties, and personalities—which would otherwise be at odds with one another—unite against it.
The Pharisees, scribes, and high priests of orthodoxy, conservatism, liberalism, Marxism, and so on have launched a joint, bitter feud and, on the basis of their dogmas, demonstrate with precision the impossibility, irregularity, outrageousness, and hostility to culture of this new phenomenon - however, this new phenomenon no longer recognizes those scribes, because it brings with it different standards.
The völkische movement is already a force to be reckoned with today, and therefore, it faces yet another danger besides the struggle waged by united but decaying Pharisees: it faces the danger that ambitious, scheming hypocrites will draw near and exploit the joy over every new comrade-in-arms for base purposes, or, it may happen that tasteless windbags loudly declare their allegiance to us, and our opponents' dismissal of them will ultimately be directed at us.
This is where the difficult but equally necessary struggle begins—one from which there is no escape. And yet, eternal life ensures that, little by little, the well-meaning dreamers are weeded out, and the chatterers, schemers, and intellectual parasites are removed; all the more uplifting, then, is the experience of seeing more and more tried-and-true people at work, full of dedication.
We believe that many a worker, many an employee, writer, officer, etc., sometimes pauses in his work, and that a warm feeling runs through him at the realization that he is serving, with his whole being, an idea which he knows deep down will be the one to renew and purify our national soul, and under whose guidance the German people will one day rise again united and strive for freedom once more.

Even outside the movement, we know of many throughout Germany who feel similarly and wish to act accordingly; we also know, however, that many are still isolated, and we know that the environment surrounding many is still dull, crude, and marked by a narrow-mindedness that we, of all people, must combat most vigorously (regardless of our own faults).
When, however, the time is ripe, they will all flow into the current of national thought, for even if this current still carries some dross today, it will be settled out: the waves of the national movement will one day flow through the German lands, saving and revitalizing.
And when we turn our gaze to other countries, we see that, in response to the same deception that ensnares us, similar organic impulses are surging up everywhere, for wherever a people is despised, violated, or humiliated; wherever it has been plunged into turmoil through its own fault or that of others, a unifying fire blazes forth, whether in India, in Egypt, or on the Bosporus.
The international ideal in religion, economics, and politics is dying, and the nationalist ideal is being born; even the old rationalism has proven to be a false, purely egoistic one, as it still often serves the

international order, which, at the height of its power, is already struggling for its very existence: this rationalism, too, will die.
In various forms, then, yet similar in origin and goals, the ethnic worldview is spreading today like a pervasive force from the Indian Ocean to the North Sea: millions may not yet know what it is all about, but hundreds of millions already feel it today.

Today marks another turning point in world history: one began for Europe at the start of the 16th century; another at the end of the 18th century, and once again, at the beginning of the 20th century, there is once again decline and rebirth.
We know where we belong, though we cannot discern what the future holds for us in detail, and we cannot say exactly what forms our longing will one day take - and yet, we see a goal shining in the distance, and have set out on the journey toward it, for it draws us irresistibly: this faith will one day prove us right.
We are the forerunners of a new era, and even if many or all of us should not live to see it, we will still be able to say at the end: we have lived, and it was beautiful to live and to fight...